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out of the egg."98 Like it or not, both foreign and international law are already part of our
law. In time, I expect, those who continue to deny that reality will be remembered like those
who "assumed the attitude once ascribed.., to the British: when told how things are done
in another country they simply say 'How funny.' ,
MISUSING INTERNATIONAL SOURCES TO INTERPRET THE CONSTITUTION
By Roger P. Alford*
In the keynote address to the 2003 annual meeting of the American Society of International Law,Justice Stephen Breyer declared that "comparative analysis emphatically is relevant
to the task of interpreting constitutions and enforcing human rights."' Justice Breyer concluded that nothing could be "more exciting for an academic, practitioner, orjudge than the
global legal enterprise that is now upon us."2 In a room filled with international lawyers and
academics, he received a home court standing ovation.
I would hazard that the wider legal academy would not have receivedJustice Breyer's speech
with nearly the same enthusiasm, just as it will not warmly embrace the "remarkable" and
"quite extraordinary"' appeal to international sources4 that is evident in recent Supreme Court
decisions.' For if we acceptJustice Breyer's incipient constitutional comparativism, conceding thatjudges everywhere face the "same kinds of problems ... armed with the same kinds
of legal instruments,"6 then we accept a potential "change [to] the course of American law"7
through expansion of the traditional "canon of authoritative materials from which constitutional common law reasoning might go forward."8 That canon has traditionally been viewed
as encompassing text, structure, history, and national experience. 9 Including a new source
Breyer, supra note 33, at 267.
"James Michael, Homosexuals and Privacy, 138 NEW L.J. 831, 831 (1988).
"

*Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law, Earlier versions of these comments were presented at the 2002 annual conference of the American Society ofInternational Law, Section on International Law
in Domestic Courts, Fordham University Law School; and the 2003 International Law Society-West symposium at
Loyola of Los Angeles Law School. I gratefully acknowledge the comments of the participants at those conferences,
as well as the research assistance of David Dae Hoon Kim, Georgetown University Law Center.
' Stephen Breyer, Keynote Address, 97 ASIL PROC. 265, 265 (2003) (quoting Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Deborah
Jones Merritt, Affirmative Action: An International Human Rights Dialogue, Fifty-first Cardozo Memorial Lecture
(Feb. 11, 1999), in 21 CARDozo L. REV. 253, 282 (1999)).
2 Id. at 268.
5
Peter Rubin, American ConstitutionSociety Supreme CourtRoundup (July 1, 2003), at <http://www.acslaw.org/pdf/
SCOTUStrans.pdf> (describing references to European Court of Human Rights in Supreme Court's Lawrence
decision as "remarkable" and "quite extraordinary"); see also InferiorImports, INVESTOR'S BUS. DAILY,July 10, 2003,
atA15 (discussing "disturbing" approach in Lawrenceof using foreign courts to interpret Constitution); Tony Mauro,
Supreme Court Openingup to World Opinion, LEGAL TIMES,July 7, 2003, at 1, 8 (this year was "breakthrough term" in
which "the ostrich's head came out of the sand"). For a particularly sharp critique, see ROBERT H. BORK, COERCING
VIRTUE: THE WORLDWIDE RULE OFJUDGES 15-25, 135-39 (2003) (discussing "insidious appeal of internationalism"
in constitutional interpretation).
1use the term "international sources" in order to include the full panoply of transnational comparative materials that may be borrowed in the interpretive process, including international and foreign laws and practices.
5 For a discussion of these cases, see text at notes 21-24, 40-41, 58-61 infra.
' Stephen Breyer, R6flexions relatives au principe de fraternit6, Address to the 30th Congress of the Association
of French-Speaking Constitutional Courts (June 20, 2003), at <http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/
speeches/sp_06-20-03.html> ("En un mot on trouve partout desjuges faisant face aux mmes esphces de problimes
et armts des mhmes esphces d'instrumentsjuridiques.").
7 Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts,44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 191, 203 (2003) (discussing potential
change resulting from cross-fertilization).
' Charles Fried, Scholars andjudges,Reason and Power,23 HARV.J.L. &PUB. POL'Y807, 819 (2000) (discussingJustice
Breyer's proposal to use comparative materials in Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997)).
9 See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORYOFTHE CONSTITUTION 3-119 (1982); LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 75 (2000).
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fundamentally destabilizes the equilibrium of constitutional decision making. Using international law as an interpretive aid also ignores the Supremacy Clause, which renders all of our
laws subject to, and not source material for, our Constitution.
But even assuming that using international sources to interpret the Constitution were appropriate, I am doubtful that it would be advisable. It would be inadvisable because it assumes that
such a project could be (and would be) done in a rigorously empirical, rather than a haphazard, manner, and doubly inadvisable because, in a country that is one of the world's foremost
guarantors of civil liberties, a robust use of international sources could have the unintended
consequence of undermining rather than promoting numerous constitutional guarantees.
Of course, this essay does not suggest that international sources should never be used as
persuasive authority in certain types of constitutional analysis.'" Rather, the purpose of this
essay is to outline a few of the potential misuses that may occur if international and foreign
materials are referenced in interpretation of the Constitution."
I. COUNTERMAJORITARIAN USE OF INTERNATIONAL SOURCES

The first misuse of international sources-particularly evident in death penalty litigation occurs when the "global opinions of humankind" are ascribed constitutional value to thwart
the domestic opinions of Americans. 2 To the extent that value judgments are a source of
constitutional understandings of community standards, in the hierarchical ranking of relative
values domestic majoritarian judgments should hold sway over international majoritarian
values.' 3 Using global opinions as a means of constitutional interpretation dramatically undermines sovereignty by utilizing the one vehicle-constitutional supremacy-that can trump
the democratic will reflected in state and federal legislative and executive pronouncements.
Treaty norms embodied in canonical human rights instruments are a reflection of an
international majoritarian perspective on what is required of a good andjust society. Internalization of these norms through treaty adherence and legislative enactments furthers that
" For example, Congress recently extended the copyright term to match the European Union's copyright term.
The Court described this as a "rational exercise of the legislative authority conferred by the Copyright Clause."
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 188,205-08 (2003). Other appropriate examples include the Court's occasional
recourse to "historical matrix comparativism" to understand the context of our Constitution's text, structure, and
history, seenote 46 infra,and the use of such sources to interpret constitutional provisions that textually anticipate
recourse to international law. See generally Gerald L. Neuman, The Uses ofInternationalLawin Constitutionallnterpretation, 98 AJIL 82, 82-83 (2004); Michael D. Ramsey, InternationalMaterialsand Domestic Rights: Reflections onAtkins
and Lawrence, 98 AJIL 69,71 n.14 (2004); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, InternationalLaw, Sovereignty, and American
Constitutionalism:Reflections on the Customay InternationalLaw Debate, 98 AJIL 91, 98 (2004).
" Although I am described by Harold Koh as a "nationalist academic," apparently because I have reservations
about the use of international sources to interpret the Constitution, see Harold Hongju Koh, InternationalLaw as
Part of Our Law, 98 AJIL 43, 55 (2004), 1am quite sympathetic when federal courts use international law in some
contexts. See generally Roger P. Alford, FederalCourts,InternationalTribunals, and the Continuum of Deference,43 VA.
J. INT'L L. 675 (2003). As that article suggests, to say that international law and practice has had, and should have,
a limited role in constitutional interpretation is not to say that we should blindly stick our head in the sand and reject
or ignore the broader reality of"international norm internalization" that is occurring within the judicial, legislative,
and executive branches.
12Harold Hongju Koh, Paying "DecentRespect" to World Opinion on the Death Penalty, 35 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1085,
1129 (2002) ("The evidence strongly suggests that we do not currently pay decent respect to the opinions of humankind in our administration of the death penalty. For that reason, the death penalty should, in time, be declared in violation of the Eighth Amendment.") (emphasis added). This section builds on a brief discussion of the same topic
in a previous writing. SeeAlford, supra note 11, at 772-91.
' The debate over whether community standards should have any relevance to constitutional interpretation
iswell-known. But even assuming that critics are correct that"living constitutionalism"-the notion that the Constitution "means from age to age whatever the society (or perhaps the Court) thinks it ought to mean"-is a "conventional fallacy," Antonin Scalia, God'sJusticeand Ours, FIRST THINGS, May 2002, at 17, 17, the Court undoubtedly has
embraced this "fallacy," albeit fettered with certain constraints. Therefore, I do not enter the longstanding discussion over the question of the propriety of using community standards and contemporary norms in constitutional
interpretation. I only seek to elaborate on the unsettled question of the logical limits that constrain the Court and
that it should impose in resorting to such community standards.
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majoritarian objective, and it does so consistently with domestic sovereignty concerns. But
occasionally, as with capital punishment, the international majoritarian impulse is not consistent with the domestic majoritarian impulse. The values inherent in national sovereignty
and the objectives reflected in international and foreign sources clash. If international majoritarian values cannot find expression through the political branches, advocates resort to the
courts. But in the courts, overcoming sovereign values reflected in legislative enactments can
be achieved only through constitutional supremacy. Hence the strategy to utilize international
law to interpret the Constitution. If what is good and just cannot be achieved by democratic
governance, then it shall be foisted upon the governed through constitutional interpretation.
Such an approach must squarely address what I call the "international countermajoritarian
difficulty." This difficulty shares many of the burdens of the traditional countermajoritarian
difficulty, 14which reflects concerns that when a legislative or executive act is declared unconstitutional, it thwarts the will of the people and undermines the values of the prevailing majority. Constitutional review serves as a countermajoritarian check on the legislature and the
executive.' 5 This extends to the international context as a check on the making of treaties.
The treaty-making power is not unlimited and does not "extend so far as to authorize what
the Constitution forbids."' 6 But the international countermajoritarian difficulty also suffers
a burden unique to the international context: to the extent that constitutional guarantees
are responsive to democratic popular will, those guarantees are not to be interpreted to give
expression to international majoritarian values to protect the individual from democratic
governance.
The difficulty for international majoritarians is that, while certain constitutional provisions
have been interpreted to embrace community standards, those standards have been interpreted consistently with-not counter to-majoritarian values reflected in our national experience. The international countermajoritarian difficulty would suggest that international
nonns cannot be internalized within our Constitution unless such norms are first internalized
by our people as our community standards. That is, international standards cannot serve as
community standards unless they reflect our own national experience. To conclude otherwise would grant countermajoritarian international norms constitutional relevance as a community standard.
As suggested above, the international countermajoritarian difficulty is readily apparent in
death penalty litigation. 7 Although the Supreme Court is frequently criticized for thwarting
the popular will by protecting minority rights against majoritarian values, Eighth Amendmentjurisprudence is unusual for lacking a traditional countermajoritarian difficulty. The
Supreme Court has adopted a majoritarian paradigm that it describes as the "national consensus."'"[f the national consensus is that a certain punishment is cruel and unusual, then this
" On the countermajoritarian difficulty, see, for example, Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty, Part One: The Road to JudicialSupremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 335 (1998).
15 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAsT DANGEROUS BRANCH 17-21 (1962).
6 De Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890).
not discussed here, it is also implicit in substantive due processjurisprudence. Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702,721 (1997) (fundamental due process rights must be deeply rooted in this nation's history and tradition
and "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"); see also Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303 (1993) (interest must be
so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental); Michael H. v. Gerald D.,
491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989) (fundamental liberty interest must be an interest traditionally protected by our society);
Roger P. Alford, FederalCourts, InternationalTribunals, and the Continuum ofDeference: A Postscripton Lawrence v. Texas,
44VA.J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 2004) (" [S] imilar to the Eighth Amendment, reference to global standards under the
conception of ordered liberty provides an additional check on substantive due process, to be utilized if it has also
been established that a right is part of our own history and tradition.").
"sAtkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312-16 (2002); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 (1989); Enmund v.
Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 794-96 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,593-97 (1977); Developments in the Law-The
Dialogue:When Domestic ConstitutionalCourtsJointhe Conversation, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2049,2068
lnternationalJudicial
17Although

(2001).
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American conception of decency will be dispositive. The legitimating function of this national
consensus in defining what is cruel and unusual serves as a checking function on international
majoritarian norms. Thus, the absence of a national consensus validates a punishment as
neither cruel nor unusual, rendering constitutionally legitimate what international opinion
would declare illegitimate.
Such an approach is evident in Stanford v. Kentucky, where the Court held that in determining evolving standards of decency, "we have looked to... those of modern American society
as a whole." 9 It emphasized that it is
American conceptions of decency that are dispositive .... While the practices of other
nations, particularly other democracies, can be relevant to determining whether a practice uniform among our people is not merely a historical accident, but rather so implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty that it occupies a place not merely in our mores, but,
text permitting, in our Constitution as well, they cannot serve to establish the first Eighth
Amendment prerequisite, that the practice is accepted among our people.2"
The recent case of Atkins v. Virginia21 confirms this international countermajoritarian difficulty. Advocates in Atkins argued that executing the mentally retarded is abhorrent to international standards of decency that establish a growing international consensus against the
22
practice. This international consensus, they contended, is relevant to the constitutional inquiry.
The Supreme Court did not disagree, but neither did it depart from the majoritarian paradigm
outlined in Stanford. In the factual obverse of Stanford, the Court in Atkins found a national
consensus and then concluded that this consensus was consistent with a much broader consensus among others who have considered the matter.23 Atkins thus reaffirms the international
countermajoritarian difficulty: the global consensus does not provide content to the national
consensus 24 and the global consensus is of no relevance in the absence of a national consensus. To the extent that international sources are relevant, they are used to confirm that a
prohibition is implicit in ordered liberty and not simply an "accidental" national consensus.
Such confirmation inures to the benefit of death penalty proponents, with the global consensus used as an additionalcheck on the Eighth Amendment.
In the death penalty context, the Court does not attach importance to international sources
in undertaking a constitutional analysis because in adopting a majoritarian paradigm, whether
a punishment is unusual or cruel should depend on a national consensus that gives expression to the sovereign will of the American people. Sovereign expressions of decency give voice
to the constitutional standard, and while nonbinding treaty norms may echo those expressions, they are not part of the chorus. Constitutional law cannot, as the Court has put it, rest
25
upon uncertain foundations such as majoritarian values expressed in nonbinding opinions.
Tojustify a permanent prohibition under the Eighth Amendment, one must look to the operative acts that the people have approved-laws and the application thereof.26 In short, the
Stanford, 492 U.S. at 369 n.I.
0 Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
2' 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
2 Brief for Petitioner at 43 n.46, Atkins (No. 00-8452), availablein 2001 WL 1663817; Amicus Brief of the European Union, amicus curiae, at 4-18, McCarver v. North Carolina, 533 U.S. 975 (2001) (No. 00-8727), availablein 2001
WL 648609 (resubmitted in Atkins); Brief of Diplomats Morton Abramowitz et al., amici curiae, at 7-8, McCarver
(No. 00-8727), available in 2001 WL 648609 (resubmitted in Atkins).
2' Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 & n.21.
214Of course, a binding treaty addressing the death penalty could assist in determining a federal consensus. See
Thompson v. Knight, 487 U.S. 815,851-52 (1988) (O'Connor,J., concurring). But there are currently no binding
international laws reflecting a federal consensus on the death penalty, other than the consensus to use treaty reservations to disarm those laws of relevance. See, e.g., U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 138 CONG. REc. 8068 (1992).
" Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 377 (1989).
'6 Id.; see also id. at 382 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
'9
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international countermajoritarian difficulty severely limits the degree of respect that can be
shown to the 7global opinions of humanitywhen doing so shows disrespect to our own national
experience.

2

Constitutional decision making is not a scatter diagram in which all data points, domestic
and global, are used to plot a constitutional line of best fit.2 ' Reliance on global standards
of decency undermines the sovereign limitations inherent in federalist restraints, limitations
born out of respect for the reserved powers of the states to assess which punishments are
appropriate for which crimes. 29 To the extent that international majoritarians argue that
global standards are relevant notwithstanding their inconsistency with American standards,
this view reflects far less respect for federalism concerns than required by the Court.3 °
II.

ELEVATED USE OF INTERNATIONAL SOURCES

The second misuse of international sources occurs when treaties are elevated to a status
they do not enjoy under our federal system. The entire edifice of constitutional law rests on
the foundation that the acts of the political branches are subject to and limited by the Constitution. Proposing that international law be part of the canon of constitutional material
improperly empowers the political branches to create source materials-treaties and executive
agreements-that serve as interpretive inputs to the process of constitutional decision making.
Let us posit for a moment the proposition that a federal statute should be used to interpret
the Constitution. For example, should the Equal Protection Clause be read in light of the
Americans with Disabilities Act?3 The problems inherent in such an approach should be
27 SeeJohn W. Poulos, The Supreme Court, CapitalPunishment and the Substantive Criminal Law: The Rise and Fall

of Mandatory CapitalPunishment,28 ARIZ. L. REv. 143,146-58 (1986) (reviewing historical practice of capital punishment in the United States) ;James H. Wyman, Vengeance Is Whose? TheDeath Penalty and CulturalRelativism in International Law, 6J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 543, 553 (1997) (discussing support for death penalty).
" Cf Harold Hongju Koh, PayingDecentRespect toInternationalTribunalRulings, 96 ASIL PROC.45,53 (2002) ("cruel
and unusual" should be measured by evolving standards that take into account notjust the practice of Texas but also
the practice of Kyrgyzstan).
' Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 176 (1976) ("The deference we owe to the decisions of the state legislatures
under our federal system is enhanced where the specification of punishments is concerned, for these are peculiarly
questions of legislative policy.") (internal citations and quotations omitted).
3
0 Koh rejects my notion of an international countermajoritarian difficulty on two bases. First, he contends that
my argument "assumes that thejob ofjudges construing the Constitution is to give expression to majoritarian
impulses, when their long-settled role ... has been to apply enduring principles of law to evolving circumstance
without regard to the will of shifting democratic majorities." Koh, supra note 11, at 55. This argument, which sounds
surprisingly similar tojustice Scalia's concerns about a living Constitution, see, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts
in a Civil-Law System, in ANTONIN ScALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 45 (1997), fundamentally undercuts his
central thesis. Ifjudges should construe the Constitution on the basis of "enduring principles of law" without
regard to shifting democratic majority whim, then would this not also condemn reliance on international majoritarian values? If reference to majoritarian values is never appropriate in constitutional adjudication, then on what
basis should developing international norms ever be relevant to understanding constitutional principles such as
evolving standards of decency or due process of law? As discussed above, note 13 supra,I do not assume the relevance
of majoritarian values for all constitutional provisions. I simply recognize the Court's application of them in certain
contexts-which happen to be those contexts where reference to international sources may be of the greatest potential utility-and accept the limitations that a domestic majoritarian paradigm imposes.
Second, Koh argues that transnational legal process is not necessarily antidemocratic because it encompasses
the dialogic process by which academics, nongovernmental organizations,judges, executive officials, Congress, and
foreign governments interact to make, interpret, internalize, and enforce rules of transnational law. Koh, supra
note 11, at 45. 1 fully agree that transnational legal process is not necessarily antidemocratic. But if international
majoritarians wish to avoid charges that they are being antidemocratic, they should seek abolition of the death
penalty through the directapproach ofshaping the opinions of the public and the political branches. Ifsuch attempts
fail, they do so as an appropriate reflection of the primacy of democratic sovereignty over international majoritarian
values. But they need not fail and one should not assume they will fail. The evolution of the national consensus
with respect to executing the mentally retarded is evidence of its potential for success. A similar evolution could occur
regarding the juvenile death penalty. But it is facile to suggest that someone who counsels channeling the discussion
of international values away from the constitutional forum and into other fora bears any resemblance to the parochial nationalist Koh describes who scratches his head in benighted puzzlement at how strangely things are done
in other countries. Id. at 57.
"' 42 U.S.C. §12101 (2000).
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apparent. The Supremacy Clause defines the hierarchy of federal laws and delineates the
relationship between statutes and the U.S. Constitution. Federal statutes are subject to constitutional guarantees and are not interpretive source material to be used in defining those
guarantees."
If so, it should be equally clear that international treaties are on no surer footing than federal statutes.33 Assuming the United States were to ratify, say, the Inter-American Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Persons with Disabilities,34 which
is based in large part on the Americans with Disabilities Act,35 no doubt some advocates would
contend that the Equal Protection Clause should be read in light of that and similar disability
treaties. As a result, a constitutional provision would be read in light of a treaty whose provisions were inspired by and are subject to override by a federal statute. It would be completely
anomalous to say that the Court should use a treaty to interpret the Constitution when such
an agreement can be overridden, or for that matter implemented, by a statute that the Court
would not use to interpret that instrument. 6 But advocates contendjust that in suggesting
treaties and executive agreements as an interpretive source for the Constitution.
Using international acts of the political branches-international treaties and executive
agreements-to interpret the Constitution has the potential to elevate impermissibly their
constitutionally circumscribed authority. As the Court put it in City of Boerne, our political
branches do "not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is."37 If Congress
or the executive has the power, in whole or in part, to "interpret the Constitution" and enact
laws that "define its own powers by altering [a constitutional provision's] meaning, no longer
would the Constitution be superior, paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means." 8 It
follows that if Congress cannot define the contours of a constitutional guarantee by statutory
enactment, neither can it do so directly through the treaty-making power, or indirectly
throughjudicial interpretation of that guarantee in light of treaties entered into pursuant
to that power.3 9
Given this backdrop,Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg's concurring opinion in Grutterv.Bollinger
is perplexing. Justice Ginsburg,joined by Justice Breyer, noted that
[t]he Court's observation that race-conscious programs must have a logical end point
accords with the international understanding of the office of affirmative action. The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination... endorses
32There are, of course, instances in which statutes are coextensive with or embody constitutional restraints, such

that precedents from one context may be applied in another. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,286-87
(1978) (Powell,J.);-Reinav. United States, 364 U.S. 507,514 (1960); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A.v.Hall,
466 U.S. 408, 413 n.7 (1984).
33
Whitneyv. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190,194 (1888) ("[A] treaty is placed on the same footing, and made of like
obligation, with an act of legislation. Both are declared by that instrument to be the supreme law of the land, and
no superior efficacy is given to either over the other.").
s4Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Persons with Disabilities,
OAS Doc. AG/RES, 1608 (XXIX-0199) (June 7,1999), availableat<http://wwwv.oas.org/juridico/english/ga-res99/
eresl608.htm>.
15 RodrigoJimnez, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct and Its Impact on Internationaland Latin American Law,'52
ALA. L. REv. 419,420 (2000); see also Theresia Degener, InternationalDisabilityLaw--A New Legal Subject on the Rise:
The InterregionalExperts'Meetingin Hong Kong, December 13-17, 1999, 18 BERKELEYJ. INT'L L. 180, 184 (2000).
"M Cf Reid v. Covert,'354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957) ("It would be completely anomalous to say that the Court should use
a treaty to interpret the Constitution when such an agreement can be overridden by a statute that must conform
to that instrument.").
17City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997).
IId. at 528-29 (quoting Marbury v.. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
s To take the City of Boerne example, if the Religious Freedom Restoration Act is an impermissible attempt by
Congress to define a constitutional guarantee, a treaty that achieved the same result would likewise be impermissible.
SeeCurtis A. Bradley, Breard, OurDualistConception, and the InternationalistConception,51 STAN. L. REV. 529,555 (1999).
But seeGerald L. Neuman, GlobalDimensionsof RFRA, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 33,42-46,53 (1997); Gerald L. Neuman,
The Nationalizationof Civil Liberties, Revisited, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1630, 1645 & n. 101 (1999). An indirect approach
of interpreting the guarantee in light of a non-self-executing treaty poses a lesser variation of that same threat.
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special and concrete measures to ensure the adequate development and protection of
certain racial groups or individuals belonging to them, for the purpose of guaranteeing
them the full and equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 0
But it is far from clear what relevance that treaty has to the constitutional analysis if one takes
seriously the Supremacy Clause and the Senate's treaty ratification confirming that supremacy.4 This hierarchy mandates that the treaty be subject to constitutional constraints and not
serve as an interpretive source of those constraints.
This misuse is also evident when it is argued, asJustice Harry Blackmun has, that the Court
has relied on international law in other contexts and that "[u]nder the principles set forth
in The PaqueteHabana,interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, no less than interpretations
of treaties and statutes, should be informed by a decent respect for the global opinions of
mankind."42 Of course international law is part of our law.4" But it is not our protean law. The
status of international law remains subconstitutional, and cannot be changed to ignore the
hierarchy that renders all of our laws subject to constitutional constraints. The Court has regu-

larly and uniformly recognized the supremacy of the Constitution over a treaty. "Exercis [ing]
power under an international agreement without observing constitutional prohibitions"
would, in effect, permit the executive and the Senate to amend the Constitution "in a manner
not sanctioned by Article V." Likewise, attempts to construe the Constitution in light of Executive and Senate action embodied in contemporary treaties grant the political branches a role
not envisioned by the framers under the Supremacy Clause.
I do not mean to overdraw the point. It is certainly arguable that international laws themselves are not being elevated to an improper status within the federalist hierarchy but, rather,
that it is the value judgments underlying those laws that are of constitutional import.Just as
other materials in the domestic context reflect certain fundamental values that may be relevant to the constitutional analysis, so, too, are certain values reflected on the international
and foreign plane. To be sure, traditional sources of constitutional authority are value infused,
such that appeals to normative arguments are useful to understand text, framers' intent,
judicial precedent, or constitutional theory.45 But the values reflected in contemporary international laws are independent of those other interpretive categories. One does not analyze
contemporary human rights treaties or the current practice of nations to understand our
Constitution's text, structure, or history.46 At most under this approach, then, international
sources offer delocalized, independent moral and political arguments that serve as an index

4 Grutterv. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,342 (2003) (Ginsburg,J., concurring) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
41 A proviso to the ratification stipulates that "[n]othing in this Convention requires or authorizes legislation,
or other action,.., prohibited by the Constitution of the United States as interpreted by the United States." U.S.
Reservations, Understandings and Declarations, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, 140 CONG. REc. 14,326 (1994).
4
HarryA.Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations, 104 YALE L.J. 39,48 (1994); see also Koh, supra note
12, at 1103.
" Under The PaqueteHabana,reference to and reliance upon international law are appropriate and frequently
occur when rights depending upon itare duly presented for their determination. ThePaqueteHabana,175 U.S. 677,
700 (1900); seegenerallyAlford, supranote 11, at 746-59. While there are subjects of constitutional law that likely anticipate recourse to international law for resolution, see citations at note 10 supra, the aspirational individual rights
provisions of the Constitution are not among them.
44
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957); see also Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 324 (1988) ("[Nitagreementwith
a foreign nation can confer power on the Congress, or on any other branch of Government, which is free from
the restraints of the Constitution." (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957)).
4' Richard H. FallonJr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of ConstitutionalInterpretation,100 HARv. L. REv. 1189,
1262-63 (1987).
46
However, the Court has on various occasions engaged in what one may call "historical matrix comparativism,"
referencing historical international and foreign materials to understand the context of our Constitution's text and
Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 759-66 (1996); Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 723
structure. See, e.g.,
(1988); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568,583-84 (1961); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,624-25 (1886);
Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168,183-89 (1881); seealsoDavid Fontana, Refined Comparativismin InternationalLaw,
49 UCLA L. REV. 539, 550-51 (2001) (discussing "genealogical comparativism").
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of the correctness of competing claims about essentially contestable concepts embodied in
aspirational provisions of the Constitution.47 With such "value comparativism" the interpretive
materials are not used in the constitutional analysis as international laws binding and operative in the United States, but simply as yet another comparative reference point, reflecting
a "formal expression of society's agreement on basic principles." But if international sources
simply aid constitutional value arguments, they deserve a status at the bottom of the hierarchy
of the interpretive canon,4' below domestic valuejudgments reflecting our own national experience,5" and on a par with other independent sources of normative valuejudgments, legal
2
and perhaps even extralegal.5 In short, if international sources are "not irrelevant" to the
constitutional inquiry, they are emphatically less relevant than other hermeneutical tools.
III. HAPHAZARD

USE OF INTERNATIONAL SOURCES

The third misuse of international sources occurs when the Court references them haphazardly, relying on only those materials that are readily at its fingertips. In the international legal
arena, where the Court has little or no expertise, the Court is unduly susceptible to selective and
incomplete presentations of the true state of international and foreign affairs. If the suggestion
is that international sources may "cast an empirical light on the consequences of different solutions to a common legal problem,"5" it is incumbent upon the Court to engage in empirical
rather than haphazard comparativism. It is far from evident that this is what the Court is doing.
Rather than recognize the illegitimacy of haphazard comparativism, the tendency is to
ignore orjustify it. One noted scholar, Mark Tushnet, has co-opted a clever term-"bricolage"to describe andjustify the haphazard grasping at comparative materials. For Tushnet, interpretive bricolage is essentially a random, playful, and perhaps even unconscious process of
reaching into a grab bag and using the first thing that happens to fit the constitutional problem at hand.54 Unlike the engineer, who rationally sorts through competing materials to
assemble a constitutionally coherent design, the interpretive "bricoleur" co-opts and transforms
55
existing legal material to address a constitutional problem. But, of course, for a Supreme
Courtjustice uninitiated in the details of international and comparative law, the tools that will
56
be "at hand" will be the ones made available to him or her by international legal experts.
" Fallon, supra note 45, at 1263. Illustrative of this index are references to "English-speaking peoples" in order
to understand the concept of"implicit in ordered liberty." See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,673 n.42 (1977);
Fosterv. California, 394 U.S. 440,449-50 (1969) (Black,J., dissenting); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165,169 (1952);
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25,27-28 (1949); seealso Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361,369 n.1 (1989); Afford, supra

note 17. Such "value comparativism" appears to resemble Gerald Neuman's argument concerning the "suprapositive" use of international law. Neuman, supra note 10, at 84, 87-88.
48Sandra Day O'Connor, Keynote Address, 96 ASIL PROC. 348, 351 (2002).
45
Fallon, supra note 45, at 1194,1244-46, 1264-65 (value arguments below arguments based on text, founders'
intent, theory, and judicial precedent).
o SeeAtkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002) (the "clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country's legislatures"); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 711
(1997) ("the primary and most reliable indication of a national consensus is the pattern of enacted [state] laws");
see also text supraat notes 12-27.
51See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472,2480-83 (2003) (citing Richard Posner, Charles Fried, the American
Law Institute, the British Parliament, and the European Court of Human Rights as critical of or inconsistent with
Bowers); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21 (giving weight to the opinions of the American Psychological Association, religious communities, polling data, and the global community to determine "broader consensus"). For a useful discussion as to whether legal sources should have greater weight in value comparativism than extralegal sources, compare
Neuman, supra note 10, at 88, with Ramsey, supra note 10, at 74-75.
5' Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796 n.22 (1982).
SPrintz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 977 (1997) (Breyer,J., dissenting).
Mark Tushnet, The Possibilitiesof ComparativeConstitutionalLaw, 108 YALE L.J. 1225,1237-38,1285-1306 (1999).
15 Id. at 1285-87, 1301.
5
6Justice Breyer has openly admitted that neither he nor his clerks can easily find relevant comparative material
and that he must rely on international legal experts to find, analyze, and refer the Court to the relevant material.
Breyer, supra note 1, at 267-68.
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Thus, expert advocates will by design include in the international grab bag of the judicial
bricoleur only those international objects that promote a particular result. Under this theory,
it is not that the Court is results oriented or utilitarian; it is that the Court fundamentally
lacks the institutional capacity to engage in proper comparativism and unduly relies on advocacy at its peril.5"
The recent decision in Lawrence v. Texas is illustrative.5" The Supreme Court argued, in overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, that even prior to Bdwers there was an "emerging awareness that
liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private
lives in matters pertaining to sex."59 The Court in particular criticized Bowers's sweeping references to the history of Western civilization for failing to take account of "other authorities"
that point in the opposite direction, specifically the landmark decision of the European Court
of Human Rights in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, which disapproved legislation in Britain outlawing sodomy. 60 Dudgeon, the Court reasoned, is "[a]uthoritative in all countries that are
members of the Council of Europe" and is "at odds with the premise in Bowers that the claim
put forward was insubstantial in our Western civilization. " "
A bricolage analysis would suggest that the Court identified an "emerging awareness" and
used what was at hand to support that proposition. An amicus brief filed by human rights organizations in Lawrence was readily available and highlighted those instances in which sodomy laws
had been outlawed, most notably in the Dudgeon case.62 The brief, which the Court expressly
relied upon, 63 argued that the "United States is not the world's only civilized society" and that
it "would be folly to ignore foreign practice and precedent at a time when courts across the
'
world are increasingly caught up in a process of cross-fertilization among legal systems." The
clear image the Court was to draw from the brief was that the United States was out of step
with the rest of the civilized world in maintaining sodomy laws and otherwise discriminating
against gays and lesbians.65
But what may have been lost on the Court is that these same human rights organizations

paint a very different picture in their human rights reports of the moral and legal opprobrium
that continues to attach to homosexual conduct throughout the world. In its 2002 World Report,
Human Rights Watch states that " [i]n virtually every country in the world people suffered
from dejure and defacto discrimination based on their actual or perceived sexual orientation."'
Amnesty International reports that "[i] ndividuals in all continents and cultures are at risk"
of discrimination based on sexual orientation and "many governments at the U.N. have vigorously contested any attempts to address the human rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual and
57Cf Richard A. Posner, Reply: The InstitutionalDimension of Statutoy and ConstitutionalInterpretation,101 MICH.
L. REV. 952,957 (2003) (advising hesitancy in constitutional interpretation given limited knowledge bases of Supreme
Court justices).
Muller v. Oregon,
' Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003). Lawrence is by no means the only example. See, e.g.,
208 U.S. 412, 419 & n.1 (1908); Fontana, supra note 46, at 585.
5 Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2480. For Bowers v. Hardwick, see 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
o Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2481.
61Id.

62BriefofMary Robinson et al., amici curiae, Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003) (No. 02-102), availablein 2003 WAL
164151 [hereinafter Brief].
13Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2483.
Brief, supranote 62, at *29-30.
5 Id. at *9 ("This Court's understanding of facts should be informed by the parallel understandings of peer
nations. These precedents demonstrate that the Bowers Court misperceived key facts about same-sex sexual conduct."); at *18 ("[I] nternational and foreign law recognize sodomy laws as impermissible discrimination based on
sexual orientation, which violates fundamental global principles of equal treatment."); at *21 ("Reflecting an emerging global movement, international treaty bodies and foreign court decisions have correctly viewed same-sex sodomy
laws as impermissible discrimination."); at *23 ("These rulings regarding sodomy laws stand atop a much larger global
human rights trend calling for equal treatment of persons without regard to sexual orientation.").
66HUMAN RIGHTSWATCH, Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and TransgenderRights,inWORLD REPORT2002 (2002), available

at<http://www.hrw.org/wr2k2/lgbt.html>.
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transgender people. 67 One definitive source not cited in any amicus brief paints a bleak picture, indicating that there is "hardly any support for gay and lesbian rights" among the population in 144 countries, that the treatment of homosexuals is far worse in the former British
colonies than elsewhere, that a majority in only eleven countries favors equal rights for homosexuals, that only six countries legally protect gays and lesbians against discrimination, and
that 74 of the 172 countries surveyed outlaw homosexuality.' In short, while the Court is no
doubt correct that Bowers has been rejected elsewhere in the world, these and similar reports
also make clear that the reasoning and holding in Bowers has not been rejected in much of the
civilized world.69
Haphazard use of comparative material is of substantive as well as procedural import. Had
the Court appreciatedjust how contested this issue is at home and abroad, it is at least plausible that it would have taken the more restrained approach of all nine Justices in Glucksberg
and entrusted the matter to the democratic laboratory.70
The great risk of bricolage, as has been suggested, is posed by the experts who selectively
place the objects in the bricoleur's grab bag. 7' Interpretive bricolage predicts that the Court
will haphazardly use international sources that are at hand, (perhaps unwittingly) eschewing
a systematic, empirical approach that comprehensively examines all "relevant" international
sources. As illustrated by Lawrence, the Court used only those international and foreign tools
that were within its ready grasp. In a subject area where the Supreme Court is woefully lacking
were materials that international legal
in basic knowledge, 72 the sources at its ready reference
7
experts selectively chose to make available to it.
67

1

Amnesty International Press Release, U.N. Commission on Human Rights: Universality Under Threat over Sexual

Orientation Resolution (Apr. 22, 2003), at <http://web.amnesty.org/library/eng-347/index>.
6
Rob Tielman & Hans Hammelburg, World Survey on the Social and Legal Positionof Gays and Lesbians,inTHE THIRD
PINK BOOK: A GLOBALVIEW OF LESBIAN AND GAY LIBERATION AND OPPRESSION 250-51 (1993); see also International
Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission, Sodomy Fact Sheet: A Global Overview, at <http://www.iglhrc.org/
files/iglhrc/reports/sodomy.pdf> (visitedJune 26,2003) (identifying over 80 countries that currently have enforceable sodomy laws).
6 Unless, of course, one is willing to contend that over 74 countries in five continents are uncivilized. Even leading
academics who strongly oppose sodomy laws have warned against undue reliance on the "peculiarly European interpretation of human rights standards" reflected in Dudgeon. Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a
Theory ofEffective SupranationalAdjudication,107YALE LJ. 273, 384 n.496 (1997). Noting that there were "74 countries
around the world [that] still criminalized homosexual conduct between consenting adults," Professors Heifer and
Slaughter argue that if one were to "rely unthinkingly on European precedents concerning homosexuality," one
could "well be accused of imposing a specialized view of human rights throughout the planet." Id. IndeedJustice
Scalia's dissent in Lawrence makesjust such an accusation. He challenges the notion of an emerging awareness as
"factually false," accusing the majority of "ignoring.., the many countries that have retained criminal prohibitions
on sodomy." Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2495 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
7"Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 718-19 & n.16 (Rehnquist, CJ.,joined by O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy,
ThomasJJ.); id. at 737 (O'Connor,J.,joined by Ginsburg, Breyer,JJ.); id. at 764, 775-87 (Souter,J., concurring);
see also RiCHARD H. FALLON, IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 68 (2001) ("For the concurringJustices as much

as for the majority [in Glucksberg], it mattered enormously that public debate about matters of death and dying was
currently under way."). More likely, the Court recognized the checkered treatment of homosexuals at home and
abroad but was attempting-as in Roeand Brown-to lead the nation (and perhaps the world) in a particular direction, calling upon "the contending sides of a national controversy to end their national division by accepting a common mandate rooted in the Constitution." Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 867 (1992).
" A possible antidote to such selective advocacy isjudicial education about international and foreign law, O'Connor,
supra note 48, at 352, and effective advocacy from all perspectives. Breyer, supranote 1, at 267 (discussing "chicken
and egg problem" of comparative advocacy). Even then, however, independent comparative analysis is remarkably
difficult. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 787 (SouterJ., concurring) (questioning whether independent investigation of
foreign country's legal administration can be undertaken by American litigation). Having worked for an international tribunal that comprehensively analyzed inheritance laws in numerous languages in dozens of countries in
order to resolve Holocaust claims against Swiss banks, I can personally attest to the difficulties associated with a truly
-systematic comparative analysis. See Roger P. Alford, The Claims Resolution Tribunaland Holocaust ClaimsAgainst Swiss
20 BERKELEYJ. INT'L L. 250, 269-70 (2002).
Banks,
72

O'Connor, supranote 48, at 351 ("The fact is that international and foreign law are being raised in our courts
more often and in more areas than our courts have the knowledge and experience to deal with. There is a great need
for7 expanded knowledge in the field, and the need is now.").
1 Of the more than thirty briefs filed in Lawrence, only one amicus brief addressed Dudgeon and only three briefs
addressed international law, all on the side of petitioners. Brief, supra note 62; Brief of American Bar Association
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74
In short, the Court has long been criticized for engaging in "history lite," haphazardly
drawing on the wisdom of the past. It now risks embracing "comparativism lite," haphazardly
drawing on the wisdom of the present.
IV. SELECTIVE USE OF INTERNATIONAL SOURCES

A final misuse occurs when international and foreign materials are used selectively. In a
75
country that "considers itself the world's foremost protector of civil liberties," what is perhaps most surprising about the enthusiasm for comparativism is the assumption that it will
enhance rather than diminish basic human rights in this country. This assumption is either
77
blind to our visionary leadership,76 deaf to the discord in the international instruments, or
selectively mute in giving voice to only certain topics for comparison.
A variety of constitutional liberties are ripe for comparison-property rights, establishment
of religion, abortion, procedural due process, free speech-but query whether these subjects
are on the agenda for comparative analysis. One may surmise that they are not, and the reason
may well be that selective comparativism promotes the goal, to quoteJustice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, of having the Constitution become "the partisan of a particular set of ethical...
7
opinions, which by no means are held semper ubique et ab omnibus."" Put simply, international
79
sources are proposed for comparison only if they are viewed as rights enhancing. To the
extent that a comparative analysis supports government interests in lessening civil libertiesor at least certain civil liberties-international sources will likely be ignored.
Although by no means the best example, one obvious instance in which comparative anal0
ysis could alter substantive due process jurisprudence in this country relates to abortion.
Since abortion was constitutionally guaranteed by Roe v. Wadein 1973, the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women has been ratified by over 170 states
without any provision for reproductive rights,8' and many countries have reaffirmed severe
government restrictions on such rights, with only a minority of countries permitting abortion
on demand.8" As Mary Ann Glendon has put it:
as amicus curiae, Lawrence (No. 02-102), availablein 2003 WL 164108; Amicus Curiae Brief of Human Rights Campaign et al., Lawrence (No. 02-102), availablein 2003 WL 152347.
71See, e.g., Martin Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American Constitutionalism,95 COLUM. L. REv. 523 (1995).
7'United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 285 (1990) (Brennan,J., dissenting).
7'Drew Days, American Constitution Society Supreme Court Roundup (July 1,2003), at<http://www.acslaw.org/
pdf/SCOTUStrans.pdf> (describing the Supreme Courtas no longer the world leader in protecting civil liberties).
77SeeLouis Henkin, A NewBirth of Constitutionalism:Genetic Influences and Genetic Defects, 14 CARDoZOL. REv. 533,
542-45 (1993) (discussing defects of human rights instruments).
78 Otis v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606, 609 (1903).
79
For example, althoughJustice Breyer denies that comparativism tries "to move the law in a particular substantive
direction," he defends its use in order to learn what "others can tell us about endeavors to eradicate bias against
women, minorities, and other disadvantaged groups." Breyer, supra note 1, at 265; cf.Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2483 (no
showing that government interest in limiting rights accepted elsewhere is more legitimate here).
" For a detailed comparison of abortion laws, see VICKI C.JACKSON & MARKTUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1-143, 173-80 (1999).
" The Department of State has described the Convention as "abortion neutral" and the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations has expressed the unlerstanding that "nothing in this Convention shall be construed to reflect or
create any right to abortion and in no case should abortion be promoted as a method of family planning." S. REP.
No.103-38, at 52 (1994); Anne F. Bayefsky, CEDA W: Threat to, orEnhancementof, Human Rights?94ASIL PROC. 197,
202 (2000); Nora O'Connell & Ritu Sharma, Treatyfor the Rights of Women DeservesFull U.S. Support,HUM. RTS., Winter
2003, at 22.
12Population and Human Rights: Proceedings of the Expert Group Meeting on Population and Human Rights,
Geneva, 3-6 April 1989, UN ESCOR, at 45-46, UN Doc. ST/ESA/SER.R/ 107 (1990) (only 18 of 82 countries surveyed permit abortion on request);Jill M. Bracken, Respecting Human Rights in PopulationPolicies:An International
Customary Right to Reproductive Choice, 6 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 197,225-26 (1995); Sarah A. Rumage, Resistingthe
West: The ClintonAdministration's PromotionofAbortion at the 1994 Cairo Conference and the Strength of the IslamicResponse,
27 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 1, 77 (1996) (noting that almost every Latin American country has a right-to-life charter;
Ireland and Germany have similar constitutional provisions; and other states, including Muslim states, have strong
legal and cultural prohibitions).
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From the comparative point of view abortion policy in the United States appears singular,
not only because it requires no protection of unborn life at any stage in pregnancy, in
contrast to all the other countries with which we customarily compare ourselves, but also
because our abortion policy was not worked out in the give-and-take of the legislative
process.... Nowhere have the courts gone so far as has the United States Supreme Court
in precluding further statutory developments. 8
Paraphrasing Lawrence, one could argue that "to the extent [Roe] relied on values we share
with a wider civilization, it should be noted that the reasoning and holding in [Roe] has been rejected elsewhere."' But the Court has not viewed 85 and likely will not view international sources
as "emphatically relevant" 6 in determining the scope of reproductive freedoms in this country.
Other examples of the selective use of international sources abound. The Second Amendment, it is argued, should be curtailed because we stand alone in the modern world in the
extent that we grant the right to bear arms.87 But few would suggest that free speech rights
should be curtailed because the United States is "alone among the major common-lawjurisdictions in its complete tolerance of [hate] speech." 8 The United States grants less protection
against regulatory takings under the Fifth Amendment than property owners enjoy under
NAFTA, 89 but we do not hear advocates contending that we should therefore place a lesser
value on government interests in protecting the environment. Nor are there demands to
erode the First Amendment prohibition against the establishment of religion by taking into
nternational law and many [foreign] laws that regard the material and moral
consideration " [i]
cooperation of church and state as conducive, and sometimes essential, to the achievement
of religious liberty."' The American approach to personaljurisdiction is at odds with international law and practice,9' but human rights advocates do not suggest that we should accordingly modify procedural due processjurisprudence to curtail "tag" or "doing business"jurisdiction over foreign defendants in human rights litigation.92 Nor would these advocates deem
it emphatically relevant in interpreting the scope of the Define and Punish Clause that we stand
virtually alone in the world in creating a civil cause of action for human rights violations under
the Alien Tort Claims Act.93
81MARYANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 24-25 (1987); see also id. at 145-54 (detailed
appendix of laws of various countries); Lynn D. Wardle, The Quandaryof Pro-LifeFreeSpeech: A Lesson from the Abolitionists, 62 ALB. L. REV. 853, 868 (1999).

4Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2483.
5

167-68 (1991) (noting
that Court's attention was invited to foreign decisions in Webster, and that as in Bowers, Court could have benefited
from reflection on foreign decisions); see also Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,945 n.1
(1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
6Breyer, supra note 1, at 265 (quoting Ginsburg & Merritt, supra note 1, at 282).
87Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV.L. REV. 413, 456 & n.202 (1999).
8 MariJ. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Consideringthe Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2347-48
(1989).
" See Vicki Been &Joel Beauvais, The GlobalFifih Amendment? NAFTA 's Investment Protection and the Misguided Quest
foran International"RegulatoryTakings"Doctrine,78 N.Y.U.L. REV. 30,59-87 (2003) (discussing the more expansive
compensation protections of the North American Free Trade Agreement as compared to the Fifth Amendment);
John D. Echeverria, TheReal Contracton America, ENVTL. F.,July-Aug. 2003, at 28, 35, availableat<http://www.law.
georgetown.edu/gelpi/papers/realcontract.pdf>; see also Alford, supra note 11, at 786-88.
9
John WitteJr., The EssentialRights and Liberties of Religion in theAmerican ConstitutionalExperiment, 71 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 371, 440 (1996).
" Linda Silberman, ComparativeJurisdictionin the InternationalContext: Will the ProposedHagueJudgmentConvention
beStalled?52DEPAUL L. REV. 319,328-31,338-45 (2002); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTHE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §421 cmt.e (1987) ("tag"jurisdiction unacceptable under international law).
2Silberman, supranote 91, at 323-24, 345; see also Beth van Schaack, In Defense of Civil Redress: The Domestic Enforcement ofHuman Rights Norms in the Context ofthe ProposedHagueJudgmentsConvention, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 141 (2001);
cf.Andrew L. Strauss, WhereAmerica Ends and the InternationalOrderBegins: InterpretingtheJurisdictionalReach of the U.S.
Constitution in Light of a ProposedHague Convention onJurisdictionand Satisfaction ofJudgments, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1237 (1998).
13 See Beth Stephens, TranslatingFilirtiga:A Comparativeand InternationalLaw Analysis ofDomestic Remediesfor InternationalHuman Rights Violations, 27 YALEJ. INT'L L. 1, 17-34 (2002); Beth Stephens, FederalismandForeign Affairs: Congress'Powerto "Defineand Punish... Offenses Against the Law ofNations, "42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 447, 483-525 (2000).
1 MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE
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Selective utilization of international sources is perhaps expected of advocates. But if the
Supreme Court takes liberties with the comparative material in order to promote only certain
liberties, few will find its approach persuasive. If international and foreign sources are arrows
in the quiver of constitutional interpretation, those arrows should pierce our constitutional
jurisprudence to produce results that we celebrate and that we abhor. Put simply, if we are
all comparativists now, the results will by no means herald a capacious enhancement of civil
liberties in this country.94 Such a prospect should give one pause before embarking on the
project of using international sources to interpret the Constitution.
INTERNATIONAL MATERIALS AND DOMESTIC RIGHTS:
REFLECTIONS ON A TKJNS AND LAWRENCE
By MichaelD. Ramsey*
In two recent cases-Atkins v. Virginiaand Lawrence v. Texas-amicus briefs urged the U.S.
Supreme Court to use international materials to expand the scope of domestic constitutional
rights.' In a footnote in Atkins and three paragraphs in Lawrence, the Court may have signaled
a willingness to listen.2 Some applaud the beginning of a positive trend. Others-notablyJustice
3
Antonin Scalia in dissent in the two cases-condemn the entire project as illegitimate.
Rather than seeking an immediate answer to the question whether international materials
should be determinative of domestic rights, this essay makes an indirect approach by asking:
if we are to undertake a serious project of using international materials in this way, what would
that project look like? Identifying the nature of the project may suggest whether it is the sort
of thing we want to undertake, and what the scope of its impact is likely to be.
The most trenchant critique of this use of international materials is that it serves as mere
cover for the expansion of selected rights favored by domestic advocacy groups, for reasons
having nothing to do with anything international. This suggestion of opportunistic advocacy
can be resisted only by developing a rigorous discipline for the use of international materials.
After a brief review of recent developments, this essay suggests four guidelines for developing
such a principled approach. First, there must be a neutral theory as to which international
" See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 410 (1856) (although "the general words" in the Declaration of
Independence appear to "embrace the whole human family... the men who framed this declaration.., knew
that it would not in any part of the civilized world be supposed to embrace the negro race, which, by common
consent, had been excluded from civilized Governments and the family of nations, and doomed to slavery"); Fong
Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698,705 (1893) (due process claim denied; international lawjustifies exclusion
of aliens or admission on such conditions as the sovereign may see fit to prescribe); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25,
29 (1949) (questioning Weeksv. UnitedStates exclusionary rule given that"mostofthe English-speaking world does
not treat this remedy as an essential ingredient of the right").
Professor of Law, University of San Diego Law School. Earlier versions of these comments were presented at the
2002 annual conference of the American Society of International Law, Section on International Law in Domestic
Courts, Fordham University Law School; and the 2003 International Law Society-West symposium at Loyola of
Los Angeles Law School. I thank the participants at each event for their helpful comments, and the organizers for
providing a forum on this topic. Thanks also to Melanie Moultrie for research assistance.
'Brief of the European Union, amicus curiae, McCarver v. North Carolina, 533 U.S. 975 (2001) (No. 00-8727),
available in 2001 WL 648609 (resubmitted in Atkins) [hereinafter EU Brief]; Brief of Diplomats Morton Abramowitz
et al., amici curiae, McCarver(No. 00-8727), availablein 2001 WL 648607 (resubmitted in Atkins) [hereinafter Abramowitz
Brief]; Brief of Mary Robinson et al., amici curiae, Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003) (No. 02-102), availablein 2003
WL 164151 [hereinafter Robinson Brief]; see also Brief of the American Bar Association as amicus curiae at 24 n.15,
Lawrence (No. 02-102), availablein 2003 WL 164108 (referring to international materials in a footnote).
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002); Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 2483 (2003).
" Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2494-95 (ScaliaJ., dissenting); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 347-48 (Scalia,J., dissenting); see also
id. at 324-25 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("I fail to see, however, how the views of other countries regarding the
punishment of their citizens provide any support for the Court's ultimate determination."); Foster v. Florida, 537
U.S. 990, 990 n.* (2002) (Thomas,J, concurring) ("[T]his Court... should not impose foreign moods, fads, or
fashions on Americans.").

